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Abstract: The main objective of the present paper is to estimate the extent to which firm investment is 
substituted (crowded-out) by investment support policies granted under the EU Rural Development 
Programme (RDP). In the empirical analyses we employ the difference-in-difference propensity score 
matching approach, which allows us to address several important sources of bias, such as selection 
bias, the simultaneity bias, and functional form misspecification, from which many previous studies 
suffer. Using panel data of 1,333 firms from the Schleswig-Holstein region in Germany, we find that 
the crowding-out effect of the RDP is close to 100%, implying that firms use public support to 
substitute for private investments. Furthermore, no evidence was found that, due to RDP programme 
support, firms would have brought forward their investments planned originally in a later period, 
rejecting the f inter-temporal substitution of investments.  
Keywords: Investment subsidy, crowding-out, substitution effect, additionality, subsidy leverage, 
propensity score matching. 
JEL classification: F1, O1, R3, R4. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investment support to firms is one of the main measures within the Rural Development Programme 
(RDP) and an essential component of the productivity enhancement strategy within the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU. As part of the RDP, more than 11 billion Euro (representing 11.5 
percent of the total RDP budget) was spent for supporting firm investment in the financial 
programming period (FPP) 2007-2013. The 2013 CAP reform extended the availability of the RDP 
investment support to the current 2014-2020 FPP (EC, 2012; EU, 2013). One of the key objectives of 
the EU investment support is to trigger additional investments that otherwise would not have been 
undertaken, which in the EU policy implementation guidelines (EC, 2006a) is referred to as the 
principle of additionality.
3
  
A key question related to public support in general, and to the EU investment support in 
particular, is the extent to which such policies actually stimulate private investment, and what are the 
second order induced effects on productivity, employment, environment, etc. Despite the fact that 
additionality is an important condition for public support and a measure of public support’s success, 
the available empirical evidence is not conclusive yet. According to the existing literature, investment 
support can have either a complementary or a substitutionary effect on firm investment. Some studies 
find that investment support induces additional investment of supported firms (HARRIS and TRAINOR, 
2005; PELLEGRINI and CENTRA, 2006; DUCH et al., 2009; GADD et al., 2009; KIRCHWEGER and 
KANTELHARDT, 2012; ORTNER, 2012). Other studies do not find positive effects of investment support 
programmes (BRONZINI and de BLASIO, 2006; Koester and Senior, 2010), implying that the 
investment support crowds-out of private investments by triggering either intra-firm or inter-firm 
adjustments in firm investments but with no impact on the overall investment level. Similarly, the job 
creation effect of capital subsidies is often found to be insignificant (GABE and KRAYBILL, 2002), as 
the impact on efficiency and productivity is found to be negligible or even negative (BEASON and 
WEINSTEIN, 1996; LEE, 1996; BAGELLA and BECCHETTI, 1998; BERGSTRÖM, 2000; HARRIS and 
ROBINSON, 2004; BERNINI and PELLEGRINI, 2011).  
Similarly, studies focusing specifically on RDP investment support find mixed evidence. Most 
studies focus on the second order induced effects of the RDP investment support such as on 
productivity, profitability, income, employment and financial indicators. Among others, they find 
positive impact of investment support on and added value, farm profitability, productivity and income 
level (KIRCHWEGER and KANTELHARDT, 2012; SALVIONI and SCIULLI, 2011; MEDONOS et al., 2012; 
SPICKA and KRAUSE, 2013), but no impact on labour employment and return on assets and equity 
                                                 
3 Additionality is one of the key principles of the EU funding. Three types of potential additionality can be identified: project-
level, programme-level and at MS-level. Although, additionally is a more general concept, in this paper we consider financial 
additionality at firm level; that is, whether it stimulates investment expenditure at a firm level relative to the situation without 
the support.   
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(SALVIONI and SCIULLI, 2011). With the exception of MEDONOS et al. (2012), none of the studies 
estimate the crowding-out effect of investment support.  
From a policy perspective, one of the key targets of investment support depends on the concept of 
additionality, which means that the EU investment support should add on but not replace the 
equivalent expenditure undertaken in the absence of the support. Given that the previous evidence 
about the RDP impact on farm investment is inconclusive, further research is needed in this area, to 
better understand the investment response of firms and the implications for 
complementary/substitutionary effect of policy interventions. 
The present paper attempts to close this research gap and estimates the extent to which the RDP 
investment support has a complementary or a substitutionary effect on firm investments. In order to 
answer this question, we attempt to quantify the potential crowding-out effect by estimating the extent 
to which the RDP beneficiaries would have undertaken comparable investments also without the RDP 
support. As a robustness check, we also estimate the impact of the RDP on private off-farm spending 
(the so called leverage effect), and the inter-firm substitution effects of the RDP investment support, 
by attempting to account for the potential impact of the support on non-treated farms. Building on 
recent advances in the counterfactual impact evaluation, in the present paper we employ the 
difference-in-difference propensity score matching (DID-PSM) approach, which allows us to address 
several important sources of bias, from which many previous studies suffer. In particular, by 
employing the DID-PSM estimator we are able to address the selection bias, the simultaneity bias, and 
the functional form misspecification. We base our empirical analysis on a sample of 1,333 firms from 
Schleswig-Holstein region (Germany) for the period 2001-2007. Using an improved econometric 
approach and a balanced panel of firm level data allows us to obtain more precise results, and hence 
more valuable for policy makers. We find that the crowding-out effect of the RDP is nearly 100%, 
implying that firms use public support to substitute for private investments. Furthermore, no evidence 
was found that, due to RDP programme support, firms would have brought forward their investments 
planned originally in a later period, rejecting the inter-temporal substitution of investments. 
 
FARM INVESTMENT SUPPORT IN THE EU AND IN THE STUDY REGION 
The ultimate objective of the RDP is to promote growth, employment, environment, output 
diversification in rural areas and to reduce disparities vis-à-vis non-agricultural sectors in terms of 
regional income per capita and rates of employment. The RDP support is not automatically granted to 
all farms but is subject to a project approval. Only those farms, which submit a project and are selected 
according the selection criteria, are granted the RDP. This has important implication for our empirical 
analysis. First, because not all farms receive the RDP, we can build a counterfactual of non-supported 
farms. Second, a selection bias may emerge, because farms self-select themselves into those who 
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apply for the RDP, and those who do not. Similarly, the selection procedure may favour certain types 
of farms. Both selection effects favour more dynamic and productive farms, because the selection 
criteria include economic viability, adequate occupational skills and competences, and minimum 
thresholds of supported investment, etc. In addition, beneficiaries need to comply with minimum 
standards regarding the environment, hygiene and animal welfare (EC, 2006b; KANTOR, 2012). 
In general, the RDP support can be grouped into three main areas of rural development: 
restructuring and competitiveness (representing 38% of the total RDP expenditures); environment and 
land management (representing 52% of the RDP expenditures); and rural economy and communities 
(representing 10% of the RDP expenditures) (KANTOR, 2012). In this paper we focus on the RDP 
granted in the 2000-2006 FPP and we cover the investment support provided under the restructuring 
and competitiveness measures. The main objective of the investment support is to support investments 
aiming at improving the economic performance of farms. More specifically, the support aims at 
promoting investments in farm capital and technology, adding value to agricultural production and 
improving the quality of agricultural products. Investment support was the third largest item within the 
2000-2006 RDP (after agri-environment measure and less favoured area payments), representing 9% 
of the total expenditures (EC, 2006b; KANTOR, 2012; MICHALEK, 2012). 
In Schleswig-Holstein (SH) the investment support for modernisation of agricultural farms was 
implemented under the Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm (AFP). The main mechanism of the 
AFP was a subsidy of the commercial interest rate for loans on firm investment (175,000 EUR to 
500,000 EUR) carried out in the milk, beef, pork, horticultural and the agro-tourism sectors. The 
subsidy of the commercial interest rate (approximately 13% of the eligible investment volume) was 
provided to eligible farms for the period of 10 to 20 years of an average amount of 23,000-30,000 
EUR per farm. During the 2000-2006 FPP, the total subsidies provided under the AFP reached 
approximately 29.7 Million EUR distributed between 1513 farms (for a net investment volume of 250 
Million EUR). The largest part of the programme budget (approximately 80%) was provided for farm 
inventory (buildings) investment support, mainly in the milk and beef sectors. The rest was split up for 
investment support (including purchases of machinery or investments in alternative sources of energy) 
among the pork sector, the agro-tourism sector and the horticulture sector. The sub-regions 
Nordfriesland (NF) and Schleswig-Flensburg (SF) received by far the largest share of the total AFP 
with most of it being granted to the milk and beef sectors. Specific eligibility criteria, such as 
investment volume higher than 175,000 EUR, and personal income up to 90,000 EUR per person or 
120,000 EUR per couple, excluded the smallest and the largest agricultural farms from this 
programme (TI, 2008).  
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TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Investment support can have either complementary (additional) or substitutionary (crowding-out) 
effect on firm investment. To identify these effects, one needs to investigate intra-firm and inter-firm 
adjustments to investment support. Whereas intra-firm adjustments capture channels in investment 
decision at firm level, inter-firm adjustments reflect changes in investment patterns across firms as, 
due to general equilibrium effects, investment support may cause a substitution of investments from 
non-subsidised firms to subsidised firms. The inter-firm substitution results from relocation of 
investment among firms, i.e. it may cause a crowding-out of investment of non-subsidised firms. The 
intra-firm substitution reflects changes in investment behaviour within firm, e.g. improved access to 
financial resources of credit constrained firms, and by inter-temporal relocation of investments.  
 
Intra-firm substitution hypothesis 
BRANDSMA et al. (2013) provide a theoretical analysis of intra-firm adjustment mechanisms to 
investment support. According to their theoretical results, the main factors determining the impact of 
investment support on firm performance are competition on input (and output) markets and market 
imperfections. Under perfect competition, investment support does not increase firm investment, 
because the support cannot improve investment opportunities of firms. In this case, public investment 
support fully substitutes private investment and hence represents a pure income transfer from 
taxpayers to firms, i.e. private investment is crowded-out by public investment support. In contrast, in 
imperfectly competitive markets, the support may be complementary to firm investments. For 
example, if firms are credit constrained, they do not have sufficient financial resources to fully exploit 
all investment opportunities in the absence of the support. Investment support allows firms to expand 
investment, and to exploit the otherwise unused profitable investment opportunities. 
Empirical evidence for intra-firm adjustment in a static setting is provided e.g. by BARRY and 
ROBINSON (2001). Due to the nature of production and agriculture specific risks, the agricultural 
sector is perceived to have significant credit constrains (including in developed countries such as EU 
and the USA) which potentially may interact with the investment support (BLANCARD et al., 2006; 
FÄRE et al., 1990). In light of the findings of BRANDSMA et al. (2013), investment support policies will 
likely increase firm investment in those agricultural markets, which are imperfectly competitive. 
BRANDSMA et al. (2013) use a static framework. However, the investment support policies may 
have a substitutionary effect on investments within firm even in competitive markets, if one considers 
a dynamic context. According to BERGSTRÖM (2000), investment support may displace private 
investments due to inter-temporal substitution. I.e., firms may bring forward investments originally 
planned for the post intervention period. As shown by ABEL (1982), a temporary investment subsidy 
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gives firms strong incentives to invest during the investment support period (AUERBACH and HINES, 
1988; ADDA and COOPER, 2000). 
Empirical evidence for intra-firm adjustment in a dynamic setting is provided e.g. by BRONZINI 
and de BLASIO (2006), who show that inter-temporal substitution considerably affects the pattern of 
supported firm investment in Italy. They find that a potential effect of investment support may boost 
investment during the support period, at the cost of reducing investment subsequently. In this case, a 
positive effect of investment subsidies is not a proof of complementarity effect as, without the support, 
the same investment may have been undertaken in the following period. 
Similarly, CANNARI et al. (2006) find that inter-temporal substitution is significant: 64.2 percent 
of firms that would have invested less without subsidies reported that they would have invested in the 
following periods. CANNARI et al. also find that inter-temporal substitution is more important for firms 
in traditional sectors. 
 
Inter-firm substitution hypothesis 
Inter-firm adjustments to investment support occur when a given programme affects (positively or 
negatively) non-supported firms (DAVID et al. 2000). The inter-firm substitution belongs to an indirect 
general equilibrium or macro-economic effect, and is defined as the effect occurring in favour of 
supported firms at the expense of firms that do not participate in a given programme. For example, due 
to the RDP support, factor prices (e.g. land rents, loan interest rate) may increase, or regional producer 
prices may decrease, which increases costs or decrease revenues, respectively, of non-treated firms. 
Subsidised firms may receive some of the investment opportunities that non-subsidised firms would 
have had in absence of the investment support (HARRIS and TRAINOR, 2005; LEE, 1996). 
Empirical evidence of the inter-firm crowding-out of investment support is provided for example 
by BRONZINI and de BLASIO (2006). Adopting the difference-in-difference estimation approach, they 
find that the supported firms have increased their investments in detriment of unsubsidised firms. The 
empirical evidence of capital price increase due to investment support programmes is provided e.g. by 
GOOLSBEE (1998), who finds that at the aggregate level investment incentives have little impact 
because, through higher prices, a significant share of programme support leaks to the suppliers of 
capital. Inter-firm substitution is particularly important when the market is small, and when firms 
demand similar inputs and supply similar outputs (ROSENTHAL and STRANGE, 2004). BRONZINI and 
de BLASIO (2006) find that inter-firm substitution is more pronounced for firms located in the same 
area and competing in the same sector. 
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ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
Propensity score matching 
The causal effect of treatment (investment support) is the difference between the potential outcome 
(investment level) with treatment, Y1, and the potential outcome without treatment, Y0.: Y1 – Y0. The 
expected value of potential outcome without treatment is not directly observed. In most non-
experimental settings the estimation of the causal effect of a programme is based on non-treated farms 
as a control group which. However, this may result in a selection bias, because the selection in or out 
of the programme is usually not random, implying that means of Y0 for treated farms (D=1) and Y0 for 
non-treated farms (D=0) may differ systematically, even in the absence of the programme (HECKMAN 
and ROBB, 1985; HECKMAN, 1997; SMITH, 2000; SMITH and TODD, 2003). The selection bias is 
particularly relevant for investment support granted under the RDP. First, farms self-select themselves 
into those who apply for the support. Second, the criteria used in the selection procedure may favour 
granting the support to certain types of farms. To address the selection bias, we define the average 
treatment on the treated (ATT) conditional on probability distribution of observed covariates:  
(1) )1,)(,()(
01
 DpZPZXYYEZATT   
where X is a set of variables representing the pre-exposure attributes (covariates) of farms, Z is a 
subset of X representing a set observable covariates, P is a probability distribution of observed 
covariance Z.  
The estimation of the ATT using the matching estimator (HECKMAN and NAVARRO-LOZANO, 
2003) may be difficult due to the “curse of dimensionality” of the conditioning problem (ZHAO, 2005; 
TODD, 2006; BLACK and SMITH, 2004). ROSENBAUM and RUBIN (1983) have shown that the 
dimensionality of the conditioning problem can be significantly reduced by implementing matching 
methods through the use of balancing scores b(Z) such as propensity score. For random variables Y 
and Z and for discrete variable D, the propensity score can be defined as the conditional probability of 
participating in a programme given pre-programme characteristics, Z: )()1Pr()( ZDEZDZp  . 
According to ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, if participation in a programme is random conditional on Z, it 
is also random conditional on p(Z): 
(2)    )1Pr(,,()1Pr(, YDYZYDEEZDYDE    
so that E(D|Y,Z) = E(D|Z) = Pr(D = 1|Z), which implies that E[D|Y, Pr(D = 1)|Z)] = E[D|Pr(D = 1|Z)], 
where Pr(D = 1|Z) is a propensity score. This implies that, when outcomes are independent of 
programme participation conditional on Z, they are also independent of participation 
conditional on the propensity score, Pr(D = 1|Z). Hence, the conditional independence 
remains valid, if we use the propensity score p(Z) instead of covariates Z or X.  
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Estimating a conditional participation probability by employing a parametric method, such as 
probit or logit, or semi-parametrically reduces dimensionality of the matching problem substantially 
to one dimension only, i.e. univariate propensity score. An important feature of this method is that 
after individuals have been matched, the unmatched comparison individuals can be easily separated 
out and are not directly used in the estimation of programme effects.  
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator for the ATT can be written as: 
(3)     )(,0()(,1(1)(
01
ZpDYEZpDYEDZpEPSM    
which corresponds to the mean difference in outcomes over the common support, appropriately 
weighted by the propensity score distribution of treated firms (CALIENDO and KOPEINIG, 2008).  
 
Difference-in-Differences PSM estimator 
Whereas the PSM can be applied to control for selection bias on observables at the beginning of the 
programme, a combination of the PSM with DID methods (conditional DID estimator) allows for 
controlling of selection bias in both observables and unobservables. The PSM-DID measures the 
impact of the RDP support by using differences between comparable treated firms (D=1) and control 
group (non-treated) (D=0) in the period before, t’, and after, t, the support implementation : 
(4) nDYDYDYDY it
i
itit
i
it /)]0()1([)]0()1([DID-PSM ''






   
where )0()1(  DYDY
itit
 is the difference in mean outcomes between i treated firm and i matched 
non-treated firm after the access to the RDP, and )0()1(
''
 DYDY
itit
 is the difference in the mean 
outcome between i treated firm and i matched non-treated firm in prior period to the programme 
implementation.  
The PSM-DID estimator thus eliminates differences in the initial conditions (observable 
heterogeneity) and differences between both groups (treated and non-treated) of firms. The first 
difference in the PSM-DID estimator, which is the change over time within firms, eliminates the 
influence of time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The second difference, between 
treated farms and control group, eliminates general changes in investments common to all firms 
(treated and non-treated).  
 
Two-stage approach to estimate the crowding-out effect 
The direct applicability of the standard PSM method requires an absence of inter-firm adjustments (or 
general equilibrium effects) to investment support. In other words, the standard PSM estimates are 
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only valid under the assumption of no indirect effects of a given RDP on non-treated farms. The 
presence of inter-firm adjustments would bias the estimated crowding-out effect of the support, as 
non-treated farms (i.e. the control group) might also be affected, thus potentially distorting the 
performance of the control group relative to a situation without the support. To address this issue, we 
employ a two-stage approach: (i) first, we estimate inter-firm effects of the investment support, where 
we check whether non-treated farms are affected by the support; and (ii) second, we estimate the 
potential crowding-out effect by dropping all programme affected non-supported firms from the 
sample.  
In the first stage, we estimate the inter-firm effect by applying the standard PSM estimator, and by 
comparing the performance of non-treated farms in sub-regions where the intensity of the AFP 
exposure was high (high probability of positive/negative effects from a given programme, P=1) with 
the performance of comparable non-treated farms in other sub-regions characterised by a very low 
AFP intensity (P=0). The first group of firms in high AFP sub-regions represents those 
“unintentionally exposed” whereas the second group (in other sub-regions) captures non-affected 
firms. The obtained differences in performance of both groups (non-treated farms) are statistically 
tested. As a measure of firm performance we use a set of commonly applied result indicators 
suggested in European Commission guidelines (i.e. Gross Value Added, employment, profits, etc.) 
(EC 2006b). A significant difference in the estimated ATT-DID between both groups of farms would 
indicate the existence of inter-firm adjustments to investment support. Insignificant difference would 
indicate an absence of inter-firm adjustments to investment support. Given results from the first stage, 
we correct our sample by excluding non-treated firms found to be affected by the AFP.  
In the second stage, i.e. after dropping all non-treated farms affected by the programme, we 
analyse potential crowding-out effect of the AFP. The crowding-out effect is measured by comparing 
the performance of treated farms vis-à-vis non-affected non-treated farms. Similar as in the first stage, 
we apply a standard PSM method, whereby a logit function is re-estimated using the same covariates 
as in Stage 1 but with the adjusted sample. The ATT is estimated before the programme and after the 
programme using farm asset value as a relevant result indicator measuring the crowding-out effect. It 
is expected that in the case of zero or small crowding-out effect the asset value of the treated farms 
would increase significantly stronger compared to the control group,
 4
 i.e. differences in the DID-ATT 
would be significant. In contrast, the presence of crowding-out effect would result in similar 
differences in the DID-ATT between the treated farms and control group. 
                                                 
4
 For empirical estimations it is important to identify a control group as similar as possible to treated farms. Yet, 
some farms (control farms) irrespectively on whether support is provided or not, may not be willing to invest, 
due to a number of reasons, e.g. lack of farm successor. As the latter factor is usually an unobservable, i.e. 
cannot be derived from micro data, it would be inappropriate to compare farms which received investment 
support with all those others which did not invest. In order to circumvent this problem we selected into potential 
control group only those farms which were “willing to invest”, i.e. those which in a given period undertook 
analogous investment (i.e. modernisation of buildings) yet, at various intensity levels.  
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RESULTS 
Data  
The balanced panel we employ in this paper covers seven years (2001-2007)
5
 for the Schleswig-
Holstein region in Germany. The choice of the period 2001-2007 is determined by the availability of 
data, which cover the period at the start of the 2000-2006 programme and one year after (i.e. 2007) the 
programme.
6
 The main data source is farm bookkeeping data comprised of approximately 10,500 
farms for the bookkeeping year 2000/2001 and 3,900 farms for 2007/2008. In addition, for specific 
comparisons data from the “Testbetriebe” (part of the German FADN (Farm Accountancy Data 
Network) data set)
7
 are used. 
Using information about general- and measure-specific conditions of programme participation, 
the potentially eligible farms are identified and selected. This group of farms is divided into treated 
farms and non-treated farms (control group). A balanced panel for both sub-groups is constructed for 
2001 and 2007. Given that the main focus of the AFP are milk and beef sectors, 1,333 bookkeeping 
farms specialising in milk/beef production are selected. The balanced panel we employ in the 
empirical analysis consists of 101 milk/beef farms supported by the AFP and 1,232 non-treated farms, 
of which 526 were located in high intensity AFP regions (Nordfriesland and Schleswig-Flensburg), 
and 706 were located in low intensity AFP regions.
8
 
A list of variables that determine both programme participation and outcomes and are included as 
relevant covariates in the PSM estimator is provided in Table 1.
9
 Following the specific AFP 
eligibility criteria covering, among others, farm economic viability requirement, size of investment 
volume, size of personal income, the exclusion of the smallest and the largest agricultural farms from 
the programme, we follow previous studies (e.g. CIAIAN ET AL, 2012) and include in the econometric 
model covariates linked to asset value of farm (e.g. value of buildings, machinery, capital stock), heard 
size (e.g. cattle, slaughter cows, breeding bulls), income and production level (e.g. milk production, 
profit per farm), input use (e.g. labour, purchased concentrated feed), financial indicators (e.g. equity 
                                                 
5
 Note that the 2000-2006 refers to the 2000-2006, whereas the period of our analysis is 2001-2007 (see further). 
6
 Given that the RDP support is project-based, the start of granting actual support usually does not correspond 
with the actual start of the financial period (i.e. 2000), and often is delayed because of the time needed to setup 
the granting system and to implement the actual selection of the submitted projects.  
7
 The FADN is a European system of farm surveys that take place every year and collects structural and 
accountancy information on farms. Farms are selected to take part in the survey based on stratified sampling of 
farms. 
8
 For specification test results see Appendix A1. 
9
 There is not available in the literature a specific rule with respect to which covariates should be selected in the 
estimation of the PSM function. In general, besides applying economic theory and using empirical evidence, 
there are three possible strategies for selection of covariates (CALIENDO and KOPEINIG, 2008): (i) hit or miss 
method (HECKMAN et al., 1997); (ii) statistical significance method; (iii) leave-one out-cross validation (BLACK 
and SMITH, 2004). In our paper we have followed the empirical evidence on the implementation of AFP to select 
the covariates. More precisely, the selection of covariates was based on expertise of branch specialists (beef and 
milk production) by taking into consideration a prerequisite that selected covariates have to simultaneously 
affect a farm’s decision to participate in programme as well as outcome variables. 
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capital formation, interest subsidy to investment), and other covariates (e.g. labour productivity). An 
important variable considered is the level of support obtained from the past RDP (obtained level of 
support from the previous programmes). Inclusion of this variable allows us to increase comparability 
and to overcome the problem mentioned in many evaluation studies concerning the non-existence of 
non-treated farms (from the current and previous RDP) in a specific programme area.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of excluded programme affected non-
treated farms. According to Table 1, farms have solid capital endowment. For example, the average 
value of farm buildings represents EUR 69,569 per farm, machinery EUR 28,903 and total capital 
EUR 650,984. On the other hand, the labour intensity per farm is relatively high. On average farms 
use 1.68 units of labour (family or/and hired labour) while the maximum represents only 6 persons per 
farm. The average yearly revenue of beef/cattle/milk related sales represents EUR 179,776 per farm. 
The number of milk cows per farm varies between 2 and 223 heads and the number of suckler cows 
between 0 and 50 heads. Besides adult cows, farms have also other type of livestock categories 
varying between 0 and 170 heads. The agricultural area of farms varies between 19 and 393 hectares. 
The average profitability per farm is EUR 43,888.  
 
Inter-firm substitution effects 
As mentioned above, to estimate the inter-firm effects, we exploit information of non-treated farms 
located in high and low AFP intensity sub-regions. The intensity of the AFP was the highest in two 
neighbouring sub-regions of Schleswig-Holstein: NF and SF (TI, 2008). We expect that the 
probability of positive/negative indirect inter-firm programme impact on non-treated farms would also 
be the highest in these two sub-regions. Should this be the case, the economic performance of non-
treated farms in NF and SF regions can be therefore described as a result of a “non-intended selection 
into programme” implemented in a given region. We measure the economic performance of farms 
using the following variables: profit per farm, economic corrected profit,
10
 milk production, corrected 
profit per person fully employed, corrected profit per family labour, standard profit per fully 
employed, and standard profit per family labour.  
Estimates of the first-stage analysis are presented in Table 2. The estimated results show that 
profits per farm among programme non-treated farms located in regions with low AFP intensity 
increased by EUR +41,371 between 2001 and 2007, whereas in the group of matched non-treated 
farms in high AFP intensity regions it increased by EUR +37,824 (Table 2). The DID-ATT estimates 
suggest a slight deterioration in the economic performance of those farms, which did not receive 
                                                 
10
 Expression “corrected” is specific to the variable “profit per farm”. Corrected/adjusted profit per farm means 
current profits corrected for specific revenues and expenses linked to other periods (current profits minus 
specific revenues generated in other periods plus specific costs related to other periods). Corrected profits 
include also adjustment for taxes and other payments pre-paid or received in relation to other periods.  
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programme support, but were located in a close neighbourhood of those who received support, i.e. 
through a reduction of profit by EUR -3,547 (-3%) per farm on average. A similar negative general 
equilibrium effect of the AFP affecting non-treated farms located in high AFP regions was found also 
for other variables: corrected profit, milk production, corrected profit per person fully employed, 
corrected profit per family labour, standard profit per fully employed, and standard profit per family 
labour.  
The negative inter-firm effects on the economic performance of farms could have occurred due to 
several factors. One possible explanation is that agricultural farms, which were directly supported by 
the AFP, considerably increased their demand for specific inputs, e.g. land (pastures or arable land), 
thus leading to an increase in input (e.g. land) prices. Indeed, while the lease price for agricultural land 
remained at the same level in regions where the AFP support was very intensive, the land price 
dropped by 7.3% in regions with low AFP intensity or where the programme was not implemented. 
Other possible channel, through which the AFP may have affected non-treated farms, is by crowding-
out their funding opportunities (e.g. bank loans). First, funds available on the market may relocate 
from non-treated farms to treated farms. Second, when the crowding-out effect of support is high, the 
support may stimulate treated farms' private spending on off-farm assets (leverage effects), and under 
certain conditions increase price of those assets for non-treated farms. Both effects may reduce non-
treated farms investment activity (either on- or off-farm), thus leading to a lower performance. Other 
factors, which potentially may cause inter-firm substitution effects, could be due to an increase of 
labour costs, milk price changes
11
 and increase in prices of dairy-specific equipment and machinery 
triggered by a fiercer competition on regional/local markets.  
As a robustness check and to identify the role of potential spill-over effects, we have also 
estimated the inter-firm effect of investment on the value of non-treated farm assets: (i) value of 
commercial farm buildings, and (ii) value of farm machinery. The results of this robustness check 
fully confirm previous results of a negative impact of the AFP on non-supported farms located in a 
close neighbourhood of supported farms. The value of commercial farm buildings has decreased in 
non- treated farms between 2001 and 2007 (i.e. because the gross investments in farm buildings were 
lower than depreciation, the net value of buildings decreased). However, the value of commercial farm 
buildings in the group of non-treated farms located in a close neighbourhood of highly supported 
farms decreased much stronger (-5,465 EUR/farm) than in the matched group of non-treated farms 
located in regions where the AFP intensity was low (-3,747 EUR/farm). Similarly, the AFP impact on 
the value of farm machinery was negative. Although, between 2001 and 2007 the value of farm 
machinery in both groups of farms increased significantly (net investments were positive and 
substantial), in the group of non-treated farms located in regions with high AFP intensity, the increase 
                                                 
11
 The perishability of milk, the need to maintain strict sanitary control and the relatively high transportation 
costs of fluid milk leads to regional differentiated adjustments of milk prices. 
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of investments in farm machinery was much lower (+9,536 EUR/farm or 39%) compared to 
investment in non-treated farms located in regions where intensity of AFP was low (+11,877 
EUR/farm or 45%). These results confirm that a negative impact of the AFP on profits of farms 
located in regions with high AFP intensity also reduced the willingness to undertake additional 
investments in farm assets (farm buildings and machinery).  
Although, the investment support programme could have also induced some positive effects, e.g. 
leading to positive knowledge spillover effects and to an increase in attractiveness and 
competitiveness of the region as a whole, our results show that such effects were minimal or almost 
zero. All major micro-economic performance indicators have deteriorated for farms which were not 
supported by the programme (non-treated farms) located in high-support regions compared with 
indicators of matched non-treated farms located low-support regions. 
These results provide empirical evidence of inter-firm crowding-out effect of investment support. 
Although, the support may improve performance of treated farms, it has a negative impact on non-
treated farms. A second conclusion of these results is that the direct estimation of the crowding-out 
effect is biased, if we do not control for the affected firms in the counterfactual non-treated group. 
 
Crowding-out effect 
Results from the previous section suggest considerable inter-firm substitution effects, which would 
yield biased estimates of crowding-out effects when using the full sample. In order to eliminate this 
bias, all programme non-treated farms (control group) located in regions with high programme 
intensity, i.e. NF and SF, were dropped from further analysis. The adjusted panel consists of 244 
farms,
12
 83 of which were treated farms and 161 non-treated farms (control group). For comparison 
purposes, we also include results for the full sample (376 farms). This will allow us to quantify the 
potential underestimation of the crowding-out effect when not controlling for the bias. We estimate the 
crowding-out effect using variable farm assets as, according to the theoretical literature (TI, 2008), any 
change in farm assets should be a result of investment undertaken by a farm; i.e. an increase in the 
asset value implies that the depreciation and sales are lower than the investment level, whereas a 
decrease in the assets implies the reverse. 
According to the results reported in Table 3, there is a substantial crowding-out effect linked to 
farm assets of the AFP implemented in Schleswig-Holstein.
13
 For the full sample, where we do not 
control for inter-firm substitution effect, the value of farm assets in the matched (control) group of 
non-treated farms increased by 86% compared with the base year (prior to the programme). At the 
                                                 
12
 Due to dropping of programme non-treated farms located in regions with the highest programme intensity 
from the data base, i.e. regions NF and S-F, and those farms where modernisation of farm buildings did not take 
place, only 161 non-treated (control) farms were left to re-estimate crowding-out effects. 
13
 For specification test results see Appendix A2. 
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same time, the value of farm assets in the group of programme treated farms increased by 92%, 
implying that the estimated crowding-out effects were as high as 82% (the ratio of 60,552 EUR/73,487 
EUR). 
When controlling for the inter-firm substitution effect, the crowding-out effect increases to 99% 
(or the ratio of 71,939 EUR/72,329 EUR). In the control group of the matched non-treated farms, the 
value of farm assets increased over-proportionally by 71,939 EUR (i.e. by 126.8%), compared to the 
group of treated farms (72,329 EUR; +93.2%). This implies that, due to prevailing economic 
conditions affecting the performance of all milk producers, similar investments in the examined period 
would have been undertaken also without the AFP support. These results also suggest that, if we 
would not have controlled for the bias, the crowding-out effect would be underestimated by around 17 
percent.  
Theoretical expectations imply that the crowding-out effect may occur either in the absence of 
any market imperfections or due to inter-temporal substitution of investments. The presence of 
crowding-out effect may imply that farms in the Schleswig-Holstein region do not face significant 
market imperfections, such as credit constrain. Our results support the hypothesis that farms are able 
to undertake all profitable investment opportunities also without the RDP, as they do not significantly 
increase their investment level, when policy support becomes available. Our findings are consistent 
with MEDONOS et al. (2012), who also find a significant evidence of crowding-out effect of investment 
support among Czech farms.  
Further, given that we cover a seven year period, farms may have changed the timing of 
investments within the study period. To comply with programme requirements and application 
procedure, farms may have shifted forward or backward investment within the study period. However, 
due to insufficient number of observations, we cannot directly control for time variation of 
investments and hence quantify this effect. On the other hand, our results do not support the 
hypothesis that farms inter-temporally substitute investments beyond the study period (i.e. after 2007). 
To have a shift in investments from the post-study period to the study period, we would need to 
observe an increase in treated farms' investments relative to non-treated farms investments over the 
study period. As reported in Table 3, the assets of non-treated farms increased by 126.8% over the 
period of 2001-2007, whereas for treated farms the increase in asset value was 93.2%, rejecting the 
hypothesis of inter-temporal investment substitution.  
Overall, our results imply that distortions in the agricultural capital markets are minimal and, de 
facto, the AFP investment support represents an income transfer to farms. As discussed in the next 
section, an indirect consequence of the support is an increase in off-farm related spending. 
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Robustness tests 
To check the robustness of the crowding-out effect, we estimate the leverage effect, which occurs 
when public funding induces off-farm spending of treated farms. Overall, the support should be 
reflected either as an increase in farm assets or as a change in other farm household expenditures 
which are not linked to farm activities. Thus, the leverage effect is an indirect test of the crowding-out 
effect, because in its presence the AFP is diverted from farm investments to off-farm investments and 
private consumption. It can be expected that in the case of significant crowding-out effect, the leverage 
effect would be positive and significant. Given the fact that we found a significant crowding-out 
effect, we expect that the AFP would have a substantial impact on private off-farm spending. 
We use three indicators to measure private off-farm spending: (i) money transfer from farm to 
farm households for living expenses, (ii) money transfers from farm to building of private non-farm 
assets and (iii) total money transfers from farm to farm household (i.e. total leverage effect). As above, 
for comparison purposes we also include the results for the full sample and for the subsample, where 
we control for the inter-firm effect bias.  
The results reported in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 indicate considerable leverage effects.
14
 For 
the full sample, the AFP brought about significant transfers to farm households. On average, 
additional money transfers from farm to farm households for living expenses for treated farms 
increased by EUR +4,653 (12.8%) (Table 4) compared to control group; for building of private non-
farm assets to EUR +3,178 (9.4%) (Table 5), while additional total money transfers from farms to 
farm households increased by EUR +14,550 (19.9%) (Table 6). These results suggest that the 
propensity to consume among farms that received support from the AFP was much higher compared 
to control group.  
As expected, the results, which are based on a reduction of the bias originating from inter-firm 
substitution effects, show that the AFP has a slightly higher leverage effect compared to former 
outcomes, in particular, for money transfers from farm to building of private non-farm assets and total 
money transfers from farm to farm households. Indeed, the AFP was found to substantially induce 
private off-farm spending among programme treated farms, i.e. participation in the AFP led to: (i) an 
increase in money transfers from farm to farm household for living expenses compared to non-treated 
control group  by approximately +4,659 EUR (13.2%) per farm (Table 4); (ii) an increase in money 
transfers from farm to farm household for building of private non-farm assets by approximately 
+9,526 EUR (27.7%) per farm (Table 5); and (iii) an increase in the total money transfer from farms to 
farm households by approximately +22,702 EUR (27.0%) (Table 6). These results confirm the 
presence of the crowding-out effect of the AFP implemented in Schleswig-Holstein. The AFP 
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 For specification test results see Appendix A3. 
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significantly increases off-farm household spending boosted by resources freed from the substitution 
of on-farm private investments with the public support.
15
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Due to unobserved variables, which simultaneously affect both the assignment to treatment and 
outcome, a hidden bias may arise. Unobservable heterogeneity can substantially affect the estimated 
results of programme effects. While the propensity score matching assumes conditional 
independencies to exclude the problem of unobservable heterogeneity, the unconfoundedness 
assumption holds even when two units with the same values for observed characteristics differ in their 
treatment choices (treated or non-treated farms). The difference in their choices may be driven by 
differences in the unobserved characteristics that themselves are unrelated to the outcomes of interest 
(IMBENS, 2003). Yet, if there are unobserved variables that simultaneously affect the assignment into 
the programme and the outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise to which matching estimators are 
not robust (ROSENBAUM, 2002; CALIENDO and KOPEINIG, 2008).  
In our paper the possibility of hidden bias is addressed by conducting sensitivity analysis by 
employing the bounding approach proposed by ROSENBAUM (2002). It allows to determine how much 
hidden bias would need to be present to render plausible null hypothesis of no effect or, in another 
words, how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the selection process in order to 
undermine the implications of matching analysis (CALIENDO and KOPEINIG, 2008). Hence, the 
bounding approach does not test the unconfoundedness assumption itself, because this would amount 
to testing that there are no (unobserved) variables that influence the selection into the programme, but 
instead, this approach provides evidence about the degree to which any significant results hinge on this 
untestable assumption. We perform sensitivity analysis using the MANTEL and HAENSZEL (1959) test 
statistics as proposed by AAKVIK (2001). 
We also conduct other sensitivity analysis to test the stability of the obtained results. With respect 
to the specification of the propensity score, the number of selected companies, changes in covariates, 
changes in parameters of balancing properties, etc. Given a standardised set of variables describing the 
characteristics of agricultural enterprises, one of the most important sensitivity tests was to find the 
minimal/optimal set of conditional variables to be included in the estimations. 
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 To further check the robustness of the results we have estimated the leverage effects for the same group of 
farms that was included in the computation of crowding-out effects (i.e. the sub-sample of only those farms who 
were willing to invest and excluding programme affected non-treated farms as reported in Table 3). The results 
show that (ii) additional money transfers from farm to farm households for living expenses increased by 
EUR 2,575 EUR compared to control farms; for (ii) for building of private non-farm assets decreases by -6,253 
EUR; and (iii) the total leverage effect increased by 5,291 EUR. Apparently treated farms in comparison to 
similar control farms, who were also willing to invest, did not have a preference for transfers from farm aiming 
at increasing private non-farm assets (negative value) yet, transfers to farm household for living expenses were 
positive (+2,575 EUR) and also the total leverage effect was strongly positive (+5,291 EUR). 
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We perform sensitivity analysis using the Rosenbaum bounding approach methodology as 
described above. The sensitivity analysis results suggest that the estimated AFP effects are rather 
sensitive to hidden bias (Table 7). A presence of a hidden bias of the magnitude of 5-10%, i.e. 
increasing the odds ratio from 1 to 1.05-1.10, would make the obtained results statistically 
insignificant. This relatively high sensitivity of the obtained results could have been caused by a 
relatively small number of observations used in these tests (99 matched pairs). Yet, the sensitivity tests 
provide only additional information regarding effects’ stability, but do not question the overall validity 
of the obtained results. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our results have important policy implications. One of the key priorities of the EU agricultural policy, 
as outlined in the European Commission’s strategic document for the future CAP, is to promote 
competitiveness, innovation, and to maintain viable rural communities. These policy objectives in the 
EU’s CAP stem from increased international competition, higher uncertainty on global commodity 
markets, economic crisis, and structural problems persistent in rural areas (EC, 2010). Farmers' 
investment, especially during the financial crisis, may play a prominent role in achieving some of 
these policy objectives.  
Our results indicate that the investment support does not necessary stimulate farm investments 
and hence it does not promote productivity growth in rural areas. Second, our estimates indicate that 
the support indirectly improves non-farm related expenditures of farm households boosted by 
resources freed from the substitution of on-farm private investments with the public support. These 
results suggest that granting policy support in form of a lump-sum transfer would induce the same 
effect as the investment support. Given that from the implementation point of view the investment 
support is more expensive than a lump-sum transfer (CAHILL and MOREDDU, 2005), the later 
instrument may be preferred from the social welfare perspective. 
Despite the comprehensiveness of our analysis, one should interpret the results with care, as 
several factors prevent us from generalising our findings to other regions. Given the specific region 
considered in the paper, our results cannot be straightforwardly extended to other regions and 
countries. The economic conditions and credit access of farms vary strongly between EU regions, 
which likely would cause heterogeneous effects of the investment support depending on the economic 
context. Further, our analysis covers the period before the financial crises. The credit-tightening 
accompanying the financial crisis reduced access to capital of private sector and thus it may have 
changed the investment behaviour of farms and potentially altering also the actual impact of farm 
investment support. In the presence of tighter credit markets, the investment support may have 
improved creditworthiness of supported farms which may have improved their access to capital thus 
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leading to higher investment levels relative to non-supported farms. In such macro-economic context, 
the estimated policy effects may have been different and further research is necessary to be carried out 
to answer these policy-relevant questions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the extent to which the EU RDP investment support has 
complementary or substitutionary effect on firm investments. In order to answer this question, we 
attempt to quantify the potential crowding-out effect by estimating the extent to which the RDP 
beneficiaries would have undertaken comparable investments also without the RDP support. As a 
robustness check, we also estimate the impact of the RDP on private off-farm spending (the so called 
leverage effect), and inter-firm substitution effects of the RDP investment support, attempting to 
account for a possible impact on non-treated farms. 
In the empirical analyses we employ the difference-in-difference propensity score matching 
(DID-PSM) approach, which allows us to address several important sources of bias, from which many 
previous studies suffer. In particular, by employing the PSM estimator we are able to address the 
selection bias, the simultaneity bias, and functional form misspecification. Estimation of a crowding-
out effect is performed on the basis of the DID-PSM approach in 2-stages by correcting for the inter-
firm substitution effect, i.e. by dropping the programme affected non-treated firms from the sample. 
We base our estimation on a sample of 1,333 farms from Schleswig-Holstein region (Germany) for the 
period 2001-2007.  
We find that the crowding-out effect of the RDP on farm investment is nearly 100%, implying 
that firm investment would have been undertaken also without the RDP support. According to the 
theoretical hypothesis, these results suggest that farms in Schleswig-Holstein are likely not to be credit 
constrained, and hence do not significantly increase their investment level, when investment support 
becomes available. In contrast, the RDP investment support represents an income transfer to farm 
households by significantly increasing private off-farm spending. Further, given that we cover a seven 
year period from 2001 to 2007, farms may have brought forward their investments. However, our 
results do not support the inter-temporal investment substitution hypothesis. These results are new, as 
the crowding-out effect has not been studied in the context of the RDP in Germany before. However, 
given the specific region of the empirical analysis, our results cannot be straightforwardly generalised 
to other regions in the EU. Further, our results indirectly imply that the high level of the estimated 
crowding-out effect is likely due to the fact that farms do not face significant credit constrains. 
However, in order to confirm this hypothesis, the interaction between credit, investment and policy 
support uptake would need to be investigated in-depth. These issues are promising avenues for future 
research.  
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Table 1: List of covariates and descriptive statistics
* 
 
Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Value of fixed assets – buildings 69569.17 54548.06 0 631047.6 
Operating facilities (value)  15595.69 18551.79 0 210755 
Machinery (value)  28903.34 23102.65 0 185988.7 
Cattle (value)  97013.16 41118.18 18590 377486.8 
Inventory stock  76.67037 1567.524 0 50538.2 
     Capital stock (value)  650983.8 357672.4 0 3004102 
Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  179775.6 82240.91 21198.5 629046.9 
Purchased concentrated feed for cattle -25978.03 17395.87 -136908.6 0 
Labour costs (total) -5298.846 7781.244 -92259.44 0 
Milk yield (per cow)  6789.374 1318.223 2630.01 10706.05 
     Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  14.22281 9.804195 0 73 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  18.69167 11.48515 0 115 
Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  30.44636 15.21116 0 170 
Breeding Heifer  17.99775 12.05994 0 97 
Heifer  0.288072 2.047371 0 47 
     Milk cows 61.4171 25.91619 2 223 
Suckler cows 0.3068267 2.578426 0 50 
Slaughter cows 2.317329 5.441662 0 67 
Male calves > 0.5 12.35709 11.68178 0 96 
Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year 15.40285 14.8271 0 106 
     Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  12.47787 15.04769 0 141 
Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  4.443361 8.604375 0 67 
Male cattle > 2 years  0.5288822 4.093148 0 121 
Breeding bulls  0.603901 0.7878868 0 8 
Pasture area  43.24649 24.67204 0 202.57 
     Agricultural area (total)  84.42382 36.27911 18.97 393.59 
Non-family labour  0.1529407 0.4041605 0 4 
Labour total  1.678342 0.6727812 0.29 6 
Milk production  419767.3 201117.9 15371.42 1624277 
Excess milk quota  14808.38 30720.74 0 306254 
     Equity capital formation  132903.1 110220.2 -39965.83 1685936 
Adjusted costs of labour employed -4004.219 7523.779 -89808.26 846.99 
Labour productivity (cattle/beef/milk 
per total labour) 
114804.2 53714.13 13475.11 578509.6 
Labour productivity (milk per total 
labour) 
2654.599 1265.577 298.8889 13103.33 
Farm profit 43888.28 28660.5 -74043.2 173640.8 
     Adjusted equity capital formation 3412.253 51986.09 -199468.8 1127032 
Profit per farm (adjusted)  29795.8 34509.47 -461853.8 172493 
Earnings from self-employment  76.90959 903.787 0 23337.49 
Earnings from non-self-employment 425.3179 2801.125 0 37425.55 
Obtained level of support from previous 
programmes 
8290.527 9950.762 0 86916.73 
Note: 
*
The descriptive statistics is for the whole sample, i.e. the number of observations for all variables is 1,333. 
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Table 2: Inter-firm substitution effect: the impact of the AFP on farm profits  
  No. of 
observations  
DID (change in 2007 relative to 2001) 
 EUR % 
Unmatched (P=1)  526 38,354 83 
Unmatched (P=0)  706 42,503 105 
Matched (M =1)  517 37,824 82 
Matched (M= 0)  677 41,371 85 
ATT  -3,546 -3 
Notes: P=0: unmatched non-treated farms located in regions with low AFP intensity; P=1: unmatched non-treated farms 
located in high AFP intensity regions, M=0: matched non-treated farms located in regions with low AFP intensity; M=1: 
matched non-treated farms located in high AFP intensity regions 
 
 
Table 3: Crowding-out effect of the AFP on farm assets 
 
Full sample 
Sub-sample with excluded programme 
affected non-treated farms 
No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001)  
No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) 
EUR (%) EUR (%) 
Unmatched treated farms (P=1) 83 73,487 83 73,487 
Unmatched control group  (P=0) 293 51,160 161 55,658 
Matched treated farms (M=1)  83 73,487 (+92%) 78 72,329 (+93.2%) 
Matched control group  (M=0) 263 60,552 (+86%) 155 71,939 (+126.8%) 
ATT (crowding-out effect)  93%  100% 
Notes: P=0: unmatched control  group; P=1: unmatched treated  group, M=0: matched control  group; M=1: matched treated  
group. 
 
 
Table 4: Leverage effects of the AFP to farm household living expenses 
  
Full sample 
Sub-sample with excluded programme 
affected non-treated farms 
No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) 
EUR % EUR % 
Unmatched treated farms (P=1) 101 13,738 45.7 101 13,738 45.7 
Unmatched control group (P=0) 1,232 7,824 31.9 706 7,956 32.1 
Matched treated farms (M= 1)  101 13,738 45.7 99 13,869 45.8 
Matched control group (M= 0)  1,067 9,085 32.9 662 9,209 32.5 
ATT   4,653 12.8   4,659 13.2 
Notes: P=0: unmatched control  group; P=1: unmatched treated  group, M=0: matched control  group; M=1: matched treated  
group. 
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Table 5: Leverage effects of the AFP to building of private non-farm assets  
  
Full sample 
Sub-sample with excluded programme 
affected non-treated farms 
No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 relative 
to 2001) 
EUR % EUR % 
Unmatched treated farms (P=1) 101 29,855 161.8 101 29,855 161.8 
Unmatched control group (P=0) 1,232 20,294 174.5 706 16,483 143.5 
Matched treated farms (M= 1)  101 29,855 161.8 99 29,307 158.1 
Matched control group (M= 0)  1,067 26,677 152.4 662 19,782 130.4 
ATT   3,178 9.4   9,526 27.7 
Notes: P=0: unmatched control  group; P=1: unmatched treated  group, M=0: matched control  group; M=1: matched treated  
group. 
 
 
Table 6: Total leverage effect of the AFP  
  
Full sample 
Sub-sample with excluded programme 
affected non-treated farms 
No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) No. of 
observations 
DID (change in 2007 
relative to 2001) 
EUR % EUR % 
Unmatched treated farms (P=1) 101 62,471 82.8 101 62,471 82.8 
Unmatched control group (P=0) 1,232 38,100 62.1 706 32,829 53.6 
Matched treated farms (M= 1)  101 62,471 82.8 99 62,413 82.6 
Matched control group (M= 0)  1,067 47,919 62.9 662 39,711 55.6 
ATT   14,550 19.9   22,702 27.0 
Notes: P=0: unmatched control  group; P=1: unmatched treated  group, M=0: matched control  group; M=1: matched treated  
group. 
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Table 7: Rosenbaum bounds test results (2007, N = 99 matched pairs)  
Gamma
*
 
Significance level Hodges-Lehmann point estimate Confidence interval (95%) 
Upper bound  Lower bound  Upper bound  Lower bound  Upper bound  Lower bound  
1 0.070 0.070 38,324 38,324 -12,676 100,171 
1.05 0.103 0.046 32,668 45,248 -16,715 105,753 
1.1 0.143 0.029 26,536 50,671 -23,047 111,138 
1.15 0.191 0.019 20,495 56,805 -28,464 118,174 
1.2 0.244 0.012 15,767 63,807 -32,436 123,938 
1.25 0.302 0.007 11,304 69,335 -36,879 129,455 
1.3 0.362 0.004 7,545 74,079 -42,561 135,367 
1.35 0.424 0.003 4,107 78,951 -47,675 140,823 
1.4 0.485 0.002 838 83,388 -51,330 146,999 
1.45 0.545 0.001 -3,442 87,392 -55,648 151,453 
1.5 0.601 0.001 -7,665 91,733 -59,844 156,474 
2 0.932 0.000 -35,916 128,711 -94,189 207,359 
2.05 0.945 0.000 -38,845 131,215 -98,107 212,718 
2.2 0.971 0.000 -48,007 141,362 -105,729 226,869 
2.5 0.993 0.000 -62,006 158,358 -117,343 246,818 
2.55 0.995 0.000 -65,351 161,662 -119,505 249,272 
2.95 0.999 0.000 -79,928 183,363 -134,223 277,348 
3 0.999 0.000 -81,039 187,673 -137,031 280,889 
Note: * Gamma = log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
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Appendix A1: Specification test results  
Estimation of a logit function 
After cleaning the data base (by dropping from the set of potential control those agricultural farms 
which were found to be affected by the AFP) logit function was estimated using 807 observations on 
bookkeeping farms (Schleswig-Holstein) specialised in milk production, of which 101 were treated 
farms and 706 programme non-treated farms. The list of variables (40) is provided in Table 1.  
 
Table A1-1: Results of a logit function estimation 
 Coef. Std. err. z P>|z| [95% conf. interval] 
Value of fixed assets – buildings 2.02E-06 2.35E-06 0.86 0.39 -2.59E-06 6.63E-06 
Operating facilities (value)  -4.51E-06 7.51E-06 -0.6 0.548 -0.0000192 0.0000102 
Machinery (value)  -0.0000268 7.17E-06 -3.74 0 -0.0000408 -0.0000127 
Cattle (value)  1.97E-06 0.0000146 0.13 0.893 -0.0000267 0.0000306 
Inventory stock  0.0000383 0.0000487 0.79 0.432 -0.0000572 0.0001338 
Capital stock (value)  -2.54E-07 3.65E-07 -0.69 0.488 -9.70E-07 4.63E-07 
Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  6.66E-06 9.42E-06 0.71 0.48 -0.0000118 0.0000251 
Purchased concentrated feed for 
cattle 0.0000454 0.0000106 4.28 0 0.0000246 0.0000662 
Labour costs (total) 0.0001077 0.0004719 0.23 0.819 -0.0008171 0.0010326 
Milk yield (per cow)  -0.0000613 0.0002764 -0.22 0.825 -0.000603 0.0004805 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  0.0186913 0.0178942 1.04 0.296 -0.0163807 0.0537632 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  0.0118835 0.0167657 0.71 0.478 -0.0209766 0.0447436 
Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  -0.0121226 0.0153492 -0.79 0.43 -0.0422064 0.0179613 
Breeding Heifer  -0.0060769 0.0137317 -0.44 0.658 -0.0329905 0.0208366 
Heifer  -0.0134439 0.0618279 -0.22 0.828 -0.1346243 0.1077365 
Milk cows -0.0613138 0.0338315 -1.81 0.07 -0.1276224 0.0049947 
Suckler cows -0.016113 0.0720671 -0.22 0.823 -0.1573618 0.1251358 
Slaughter cows -0.0048062 0.0287148 -0.17 0.867 -0.0610862 0.0514739 
Male calves > 0.5 0.0121035 0.0156262 0.77 0.439 -0.0185234 0.0427303 
Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year 0.0165394 0.0131412 1.26 0.208 -0.0092169 0.0422956 
Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  0.014429 0.013428 1.07 0.283 -0.0118895 0.0407475 
Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  0.0051632 0.0197474 0.26 0.794 -0.0335411 0.0438675 
Male cattle > 2 years  -0.285279 0.3196748 -0.89 0.372 -0.9118302 0.3412722 
Breeding bulls  0.1216614 0.1539543 0.79 0.429 -0.1800836 0.4234063 
Pasture area  0.0072186 0.0068231 1.06 0.29 -0.0061544 0.0205916 
Agricultural area (total)  0.0050058 0.0079983 0.63 0.531 -0.0106706 0.0206822 
Non-family labour  -0.581429 0.4297761 -1.35 0.176 -1.423775 0.2609166 
Labour total  0.3884432 0.3904466 0.99 0.32 -0.376818 1.153704 
Milk production  7.79E-06 5.58E-06 1.4 0.163 -3.15E-06 0.0000187 
Excess milk quota  1.93E-06 3.32E-06 0.58 0.562 -4.59E-06 8.44E-06 
Equity capital formation  8.19E-07 1.47E-06 0.56 0.577 -2.06E-06 3.70E-06 
Adjusted costs of labour employed -0.0001288 0.0004732 -0.27 0.786 -0.0010563 0.0007987 
Labour productivity 
(cattle/beef/milk per total labour) -3.84E-06 0.0000143 -0.27 0.787 -0.0000318 0.0000241 
Labour productivity (milk per total 
labour) 0.0005672 0.0006534 0.87 0.385 -0.0007134 0.0018478 
Farm profit -4.90E-06 8.59E-06 -0.57 0.568 -0.0000217 0.0000119 
Adjusted equity capital formation 2.55E-07 2.98E-06 0.09 0.932 -5.58E-06 6.09E-06 
Profit per farm (adjusted)  1.37E-06 5.39E-06 0.25 0.8 -9.20E-06 0.0000119 
Earnings from self-employment  -0.0005951 0.0013484 -0.44 0.659 -0.0032378 0.0020476 
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Earnings from non-self-employment 0.0000249 0.000037 0.67 0.5 -0.0000476 0.0000975 
Obtained level of support from 
previous programmes -1.32E-06 0.0000126 -0.1 0.917 -0.0000261 0.0000234 
Constant -3.443257 2.004407 -1.72 0.086 -7.371823 0.4853098 
Note: estimations in this table are based on a sub-sample which excludes programme affected non-treated farms. 
In the next step results of a logit function estimation were used to derive for all agricultural farms 
specialised in milk production their individual probability (propensity scores) of participation in the 
AFP measure. 
Selection of a matching algorithm 
As the quality of a given matching algorithm depends strongly on a data set, the selection of a relevant 
matching technique was carried out using three independent criteria: i) standardised bias (ROSENBAUM 
and RUBIN, 1985); ii) t–test (ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 1985); and iii) joint significance and pseudo R² 
(SIANESI, 2004). 
Similar to the cases of other assessments of programme impact we found that the best results were 
achieved by using an iterative procedure (e.g. linear search) aimed at minimisation of the calculated 
standardised bias
16
 (after matching) and applying min[min] as the main selection criterion. In all 
considered cases (various matching algorithms)
17
 an optimal solution could easily be found due to 
local/global convexity of the objective function with respect to function parameters under each 
matching algorithm (e.g. radius magnitude in radius matching; or number of nearest neighbours in 
nearest neighbour matching). An overview of results obtained using different matching algorithms for 
the case of re-estimation of effects of the AFP in Schleswig-Holstein is provided in Table A1-2. 
Table A1-2: Selection of a matching algorithm 
Matching method Matching parameters 
Estimated standardised bias 
 (after matching) 
Nearest neighbours N ( 8 ) 4.30 
 N ( 9 ) 3.90 
 N ( 10 ) 4.02 
Caliper ( 0.08 ) 3.76 
 ( 0.07 ) Selected (min) =>     3.70 
 ( 0.06 ) 3.95 
Kernel normal bw ( 0.03 ) 4.22 
 bw ( 0.04 ) 3.99 
 bw ( 0.05 ) 4.13 
Kernel biweight  4.65 
Kernel epanechnikov bw ( 0.11 ) 3.92 
 bw ( 0.09) 3.76 
 bw ( 0.08 ) 3.89 
                                                 
16
 The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups (ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 1985). 
17
 This does not apply to local linear weighting function matching which first smoothes out the outcome and then 
performs nearest neighbour matching. In this case more controls are used to calculate the counterfactual outcome 
than the nearest neighbour only (LEUVEN and SIANESI, 2009). 
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The lowest estimated standardised bias (after matching) was found in the case of caliper matching 
(0.07). This matching algorithm was therefore used in the further work for assessment of the effect of 
the AFP on direct treated farms
18
.   
The application of the above procedure and common support restrictions resulted in dropping 46 farms 
(2 treated and 44 non-treated farms) from further analysis, thus selecting comparable 761 farms of 
which: 99 were treated and 662 were non-treated farms (Table A1-3). 
Table A1-3: Overview of the matched sample 
Treatment 
Common support 
Total 
Off support On support 
Non-treated 
Treated 
44 
2 
662 
99 
706 
101 
Total 46 761 807 
 
Verification of the balancing property of matched variables  
One of the important criteria applied for the assessment of the matching’s quality can be the 
comparison of mean values of relevant covariates in both groups of farms (treated farms vs control 
group) before and after matching (using the selected matching algorithm). It is expected that 
application of the selected matching algorithm (here: caliper matching 0.07) will lead to a considerable 
reduction of original differences in mean values of each individual variable included as a covariate in 
the logit function, between treated and control farms.  
The comparison of mean values for all variables included as covariates in the estimated logit function 
in both groups of farms before and after matching is presented in Table A1-4. The results show that 
for almost all variables (except for the variables: number of breeding heifers, non-family labour and 
earnings from non-self-employment) the selected matching procedure resulted in a significant 
reduction of differences in variables’ means among both groups of farms, i.e. treated farms vs. 
controls thus making both groups of farms much more comparable. Furthermore, after the 
implementation of above matching procedure the estimated standardised selection bias could be 
reduced from 25.6 (before matching) to 3.70 (after matching), i.e. it dropped by 86%. At the same 
time pseudo R² decreased as expected, i.e. dropped from 0.201 to 0.119 respectively, i.e. by 41%.  
  
                                                 
18
 The caliper matching algorithm (0.07) was also found to perform satisfactory concerning other important 
Selection criteria, i.e. balancing property and pseudo R² tests. 
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Table A1-4: Balancing property tests 
Variable-Name Sample Treated Control % bias |% reduction  
bias  t-test 
t        p>|t| 
Long-term assets – buildings  Unmatched 78645 64423 26.4  2.33   0.020 
Matched 77665 77949 -0.5 98 -0.03   0.974 
Operating facilities (value)  Unmatched 17355 16524 4.4  0.40   0.691 
Matched 17400 17474 -0.4 91.1 -0.03   0.977 
Machinery (value)  Unmatched 28285 32066 -16.3  -1.44   0.150 
Matched 28410 28297 0.5 97 0.04    0.970 
Cattle (value)  Unmatched 1.10E+05 93309 43.7  4.27   0.000 
Matched 1.10E+05 1.10E+05 4.8 89 0.33   0.744 
Inventory stock  Unmatched 174.12 93.661 4.3  0.39   0.700 
Matched 177.64 115.81 3.3 23.2 0.21   0.834 
Capital stock (value)  Unmatched 6.80E+05 6.60E+05 5.9  0.55   0.584 
Matched 6.80E+05 6.70E+05 2.8 52.3 0.20   0.844 
Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  Unmatched 2.30E+05 1.70E+05 63.7  6.39   0.000 
Matched 2.20E+05 2.20E+05 6.3 90.1 0.42   0.675 
Purchased concentrated feed for 
cattle 
Unmatched -29362 -26278 -16  -1.70   0.090 
Matched -29955 -30484 2.7 82.9 0.18   0.856 
Labour costs (total) Unmatched -6808.1 -5562.6 -14.9  -1.39   0.164 
Matched -6815.2 -6229.6 -7 53 -0.51   0.613 
Milk yield (per cow)     Unmatched 7351.9 6572 64  5.67   0.000 
Matched 7340.2 7283.7 4.6 92.8 0.33   0.744 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  Unmatched 17.089 13.544 35.7  3.38   0.001 
Matched 16.929 16.114 8.2 77 0.53   0.594 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  Unmatched 21.911 19.007 25.4  2.35   0.019 
Matched 21.788 21.116 5.9 76.9 0.42   0.678 
Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  Unmatched 35.119 30.305 32.9  3.04   0.002 
Matched 35.03 33.67 9.3 71.7 0.65   0.519 
Breeding Heifer  Unmatched 19.218 19.221 0  -0.00   0.998 
Matched 19.222 19.545 -2.6 -10189.4 -0.17   0.863 
Heifer  Unmatched 0.18812 0.30028 -6.4  -0.48   0.631 
Matched 0.19192 0.15312 2.2 65.4 0.20   0.841 
Milk cows   Unmatched 71.861 61.584 38.6  3.63   0.000 
Matched 71.404 70.437 3.6 90.6 0.25   0.806 
Suckler cows    Unmatched 0.13861 0.25212 -6.8  -0.53   0.599 
Matched 0.14141 0.12746 0.8 87.7 0.07   0.941 
Slaughter cows Unmatched 2.4158 1.5312 20.9  2.00   0.045 
Matched 2.4646 2.2616 4.8 77 0.30   0.764 
Male calves > 0.5    Unmatched 14.762 10.374 41.7  3.78   0.000 
Matched 14.525 14.631 -1 97.6 -0.06   0.952 
Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year    Unmatched 19.465 13.006 44.7  4.20   0.000 
Matched 19.364 20.036 -4.7 89.6 -0.27   0.789 
Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  Unmatched 16.04 9.7578 43.3  4.20   0.000 
Matched 15.818 15.918 -0.7 98.4 -0.04   0.969 
Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  Unmatched 4.6337 2.6785 26.3  2.68   0.008 
Matched 4.5556 4.4296 1.7 93.6 0.10   0.923 
Male cattle > 2 years  Unmatched 0.05941 0.2762 -15.4  -1.10   0.270 
Matched 0.0404 0.04363 -0.2 98.5 -0.08   0.936 
Breeding bulls  Unmatched 0.63366 0.61331 2.4  0.24   0.814 
Matched 0.60606 0.60544 0.1 96.9 0.01   0.996 
Pasture area (ha) Unmatched 48.231 39.04 36.1  3.78   0.000 
Matched 47.908 45.685 8.7 75.8 0.59   0.554 
Agricultural area (total)  (ha) Unmatched 94.335 83.954 26.9  2.69   0.007 
Matched 93.834 92.596 3.2 88.1 0.23   0.819 
Non-family labour Unmatched 0.17337 0.18493 -2.5  -0.24   0.810 
Matched 0.17586 0.14761 6.2 -144.3 0.47   0.637 
Labour total Unmatched 1.7463 1.7426 0.5  0.05   0.961 
Matched 1.7523 1.7325 2.7 -429.2 0.19   0.850 
Milk production  Unmatched 5.30E+05 4.10E+05 59  5.83   0.000 
Matched 5.30E+05 5.10E+05 5.9 90.1 0.39   0.697 
Excess milk quota  Unmatched 22801 15735 20.8  1.93   0.054 
Matched 23064 20533 7.4 64.2 0.48   0.634 
Equity capital formation  Unmatched 1.60E+05 1.30E+05 23.5  2.08   0.038 
Matched 1.60E+05 1.50E+05 5.4 77.1 0.40   0.691 
Adjusted costs of labour 
employed 
Unmatched -5374.4 -4303 -13.2  -1.24   0.216 
Matched -5387.1 -4827.3 -6.9 47.8 -0.50   0.618 
Labour productivity (cattle/beef / 
milk per total labour)    
Unmatched 1.40E+05 1.10E+05 69.6  6.80   0.000 
Matched 1.40E+05 1.40E+05 0.5 99.2 0.03   0.977 
Labour productivity (milk per 
total labour)    
Unmatched 3303 2487.6 64.8  6.21   0.000 
Matched 3266.7 3255.9 0.9 98.7 0.05   0.961 
Farm profit Unmatched 54629 40518 48.8  4.65   0.000 
Matched 54634 52293 8.1 83.4 0.53   0.594 
Adjusted equity capital formation Unmatched 4818 2168.3 5.6  0.42   0.674 
Matched 4847.6 6284 -3 45.8 -0.24   0.808 
Profit per farm (adjusted)     Unmatched 35728 23889 35.3  2.97   0.003 
Matched 35855 34159 5.1 85.7 0.36   0.722 
Earnings from self-employment    Unmatched 9.8107 93.767 -10.2  -0.73   0.467 
Matched 10.009 11.991 -0.2 97.6 -0.18   0.858 
Earnings from non-self-
employment    
Unmatched 466.01 534.24 -2.3  -0.20   0.845 
Matched 475 389.37 2.9 -25.5 0.22   0.827 
Obtained level of support from 
previous programmes 
Unmatched 9340 8685.3 5.8  0.55   0.583 
Matched 9206.3 8954.3 2.2 61.5 0.16   0.871 
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Note: estimations in this table are based on a sub-sample which excludes programme affected non-treated farms. 
 
Appendix A2: Specification test results of the crowding-out effect 
Given the previously calculated individual propensity scores for treated farms and control group, and 
after imposing restrictions on the common support region, a new relevant matching technique was 
selected (a truncated data base consisted of 244 observations of which 83 observations were on treated 
farms and 161 on non-treated farms), according to three independent criteria: i) standardised bias 
(ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 1985); ii) t–test (ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 1985); and iii) joint significance 
and pseudo R² (SIANESI, 2004). As a result, a kernel (normal kernel, b.w. 0.08) was found to be the 
“best” matching technique and was selected for calculation of the crowding-out effect effects of the 
AFP.  
The comparison of mean values for all variables included as covariates in the estimated logit function 
in both groups of farms before and after matching is presented in Table A2-1. The results show that 
for almost all variables (except for the number of breeding heifers and total labour) the selected 
matching procedure resulted in a significant reduction of differences in variables’ means among both 
groups of farms, i.e. treated farms versus controls thus making both groups of farms much more 
comparable. 
 
Table A2-1: Balancing property tests (crowding-out effect) 
Variable-Name Sample Treated Control % bias 
|% reduction 
bias | 
t-test 
t        p>|t| 
Long-term assets – buildings  Unmatched 80059 51608 57.2  4.26   0.000 
Matched 77609 56705 42 26.5 2.51   0.013 
Operating facilities (value)  Unmatched 16750 17352 -3.5  -0.25   0.800 
Matched 16952 17281 -1.9 45.3 -0.12   0.906 
Machinery (value)  Unmatched 27561 35370 -36.9  -2.61   0.010 
Matched 27622 32227 -21.8 41 -1.34   0.182 
Cattle (value)  Unmatched 1.10E+05 1.00E+05 23.1  1.74   0.083 
Matched 1.10E+05 1.10E+05 -7.8 66.1 -0.47   0.638 
Inventory stock  Unmatched 211.8 0 15.5  1.40   0.164 
Matched 225.4 0 16.5 -6.4 1.00   0.320 
Capital stock (value)  Unmatched 6.70E+05 6.20E+05 14  1.01   0.316 
Matched 6.60E+05 6.40E+05 4.4 68.6 0.28   0.782 
Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  Unmatched 2.20E+05 1.90E+05 37  2.81   0.005 
Matched 2.20E+05 2.20E+05 -6.3 83 -0.39   0.700 
Purchased concentrated feed for cattle Unmatched -29142 -28927 -1.1  -0.09   0.931 
Matched -30490 -31376 4.6 -313.5 0.29   0.776 
Labour costs (total) Unmatched -6428.1 -5904.8 -6  -0.42   0.672 
Matched -6232.8 -6232.2 0 99.9 -0.00   1.000 
Milk yield (per cow)     Unmatched 7330.4 6846.9 38.4  2.77   0.006 
Matched 7244.4 7231.2 1.1 97.3 0.07   0.945 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  Unmatched 17.181 14.012 31.2  2.33   0.021 
Matched 16.59 17.002 -4.1 87 -0.22   0.824 
Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  Unmatched 21.855 20.205 14.1  1.05   0.293 
Matched 21.372 21.056 2.7 80.9 0.17   0.867 
Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  Unmatched 35.096 32.168 19.5  1.44   0.152 
Matched 34.385 33.672 4.7 75.7 0.30   0.767 
Breeding Heifer  Unmatched 19.06 20.919 -14.2  -1.06   0.289 
Matched 19.205 21.536 -17.9 -25.4 -1.06   0.289 
Heifer  Unmatched 0.22892 0.13043 12.1  0.94   0.347 
Matched 0.24359 0.07922 20.2 -66.9 1.31   0.193 
Milk cows   Unmatched 71.096 64.745 23.6  1.76   0.079 
Matched 69.859 70.878 -3.8 84 -0.23   0.820 
Suckler cows    Unmatched 0.16867 0.39752 -9.5  -0.63   0.529 
Matched 0.17949 0.2351 -2.3 75.7 -0.17   0.865 
Slaughter cows Unmatched 2.3253 1.4472 21.4  1.63   0.104 
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Matched 2.2179 2.2264 -0.2 99 -0.01   0.990 
Male calves > 0.5    Unmatched 14.735 11.708 26.8  1.91   0.058 
Matched 14.218 15.16 -8.3 68.9 -0.43   0.667 
Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year    Unmatched 19.542 13.969 38.1  2.78   0.006 
Matched 19.359 18.654 4.8 87.3 0.25   0.805 
Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  Unmatched 16.06 11.143 30.4  2.19   0.029 
Matched 15.821 16.31 -3 90 -0.14   0.887 
Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  
 
Unmatched 4.506 3.1615 18.3  1.35   0.177 
Matched 4.3974 4.686 -3.9 78.5 -0.22   0.826 
Male cattle > 2 years  Unmatched 0.06024 0.34161 -14.1  -0.91   0.365 
 Matched 0.03846 0.04948 -0.6 96.1 -0.26   0.798 
Breeding bulls  Unmatched 0.61446 0.58385 3.7  0.28   0.779 
 Matched 0.58974 0.57852 1.3 63.3 0.08   0.933 
Pasture area (ha) Unmatched 49.093 40.81 29.9  2.28   0.023 
 Matched 48.201 44.891 11.9 60 0.75   0.456 
Agricultural area (total)  (ha) Unmatched 93.311 89.865 9.2  0.69   0.490 
 Matched 91.975 94.859 -7.7 16.3 -0.50   0.617 
Non-family labour  Unmatched 0.15614 0.20634 -11.2  -0.79   0.429 
 Matched 0.13923 0.18349 -9.9 11.8 -0.70   0.484 
Labour total  Unmatched 1.6827 1.7401 -8.3  -0.62   0.539 
 Matched 1.6683 1.785 -16.9 -103.1 -1.04   0.299 
Milk production  Unmatched 5.20E+05 4.50E+05 36.4  2.75   0.006 
 Matched 5.10E+05 5.10E+05 -2.5 93.3 -0.15   0.879 
Excess milk quota  Unmatched 23110 18986 10.7  0.75   0.453 
 Matched 21233 21270 -0.1 99.1 -0.01   0.995 
Equity capital formation  Unmatched 1.60E+05 1.50E+05 7  0.49   0.627 
 Matched 1.50E+05 1.40E+05 8.3 -18.3 0.71   0.479 
Adjusted costs of labour employed Unmatched -5010.7 -4587.9 -5  -0.35   0.725 
 Matched -4834.9 -4826.6 -0.1 98 -0.01   0.995 
Labour productivity (cattle/beef / milk per total 
labour)  
Unmatched 1.40E+05 1.20E+05 49  3.77   0.000 
 Matched 1.40E+05 1.30E+05 11.8 76.4 0.69   0.492 
Labour productivity (milk per total labour)    Unmatched 3339.9 2746.1 47.6  3.56   0.000 
 Matched 3269.4 3113.7 12.5 73.8 0.72   0.473 
Farm profit Unmatched 53271 44302 28.9  2.10   0.037 
 Matched 50921 51098 -0.6 98 -0.04   0.971 
Adjusted equity capital formation Unmatched 5701.7 11245 -7.3  -0.48   0.632 
 Matched 6079.4 5885 0.3 96.5 0.04   0.972 
Profit per farm (adjusted)     Unmatched 34517 25450 28.9  2.07   0.040 
 Matched 32722 32037 2.2 92.4 0.14   0.889 
Earnings from self-employment    Unmatched 11.938 14.915 -3.1  -0.23   0.820 
 Matched 12.704 11.316 1.5 53.4 0.10   0.919 
Earnings from non-self-employment    Unmatched 540.52 758.7 -5.9  -0.41   0.683 
 Matched 574.63 535.55 1.1 82.1 0.07   0.942 
Obtained level of support from previous 
programmes 
Unmatched 9207.8 8598 5.4  0.41   0.685 
 Matched 9007.9 8587.9 3.7 31.1 0.23   0.817 
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